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Since the Prorva Canal became silted in 1997,
Ukraine no longer has its own deepwater
canal between the Danube and the Black Sea.
Consequently, part of Ukrainian shipping
passes through the linking canal of the Ust
Dunaisk port, while the other part passes via
the Sulyn Canal, located on the territory of
Romania. The value of passages through
Romanian waters adds up to 0.7–1.2 million
UAH annually. In addition, Ukraine is losing
the market for international transportation,
which occurs mainly via the Romanian ports
of Constanza and Cernovoda. Therefore,
Ukraine has arguments in favour of building
the deepwater Danube–Black Sea canal.
Considering the alternative projects for the
canal, it is worthwhile noting: 
• particularities of the Ukrainian part of the
Danube delta, formed by the Kiliy branch.
It is newly formed and is undergoing
constant changes owing to alluvial
deposits from the Danube and the sea;
namely, the littoral region is getting
narrower by more than 100 metres towards
the sea each year. Roughly 20% of the
Danube empties into the Bystre estuary,
where alluvial processes are particularly
pronounced; 
• the ecological importance of the Ukrainian
Danube delta, which is one of the biggest
wetland areas in Europe and is within the
purview of the Ramsar convention dated 
2 February 1971. The UkrainianRomanian
Danube Biosphere Reserve (DBR) located
here is included in the UNESCO world
network of biosphere reserves—one of six
transfrontier biosphere reserves in the
world.
Without regard to the foregoing, the
Ministry of Transport of Ukraine has been
lobbying for two years to build the canal
across the Bystre arm, which is located in
the strictly reserved area, where any
economic activities are prohibited by the
Law of Ukraine “On the nature reserve fund
of Ukraine”. To this end, the ministry is
striving to cut out the straits and internal
reservoirs from the reserve’s territory, as
well as reduce its strictly reserved zone
almost tenfold. Furthermore, the Ministry of
Transport is ignoring any alternatives to
building the canal, which private investors
are ready to undertake. 
The option of the canal across the Bystre is
attractive, because it would take relatively
little time to build, although it fails to take
into account the entire set of possible
environmental, legal, and economic
implications, such as:
• irreparable loss of the reserve’s ecological
functions as a result of dismembering its
most important part—the strictly reserved
zone, or its core; pollution of waters with
petroleum products; disruption of delta
formation processes; 
• violation by Ukraine of its international
obligations in environmental protection,
which will further tarnish Ukraine’s image
in the world;
• losses from the reduced catch of Danube
herring (experts assess these losses to be
up to 2 million UAH per year); 
• annual increases in dredging works and
building of additional dams, which will
require constant increases in budget
expenditures for operating canal, whose
functional lifespan is estimated by experts
to be only 7–10 years. 
According to experts’ estimates, in the first
years of the canal’s exploitation, dredging
works will cover several million cubic metres
of soil (2.05–2.10 USD per cubic meter of the
soil dredged) and will be on the constant
rise. A vivid example is the experience of the
Prorva canal exploitation; after the canal was
constructed in 1957, dredging works spread
over about 200,000 cubic metres annually,
and by the mid1980s had enlarged twenty
fold.
Other alternatives to the Bystre include, for
example, the project of a lock canal via
Solomoniv arm–Zhebryian harbour, which
the private sector is willing to carry out.
This project, supported by the National
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, envisages
the creation of a canal bypassing both the
DBR reserve area and the zone of active
Ukraine is extremely interested in having its own navigable canal from the
Black Sea to the Danube. But in its desire to get the canal as soon as possible,
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine did not pay proper attention to considering
all the alternatives, and approved an unjustified decision that violates
Ukraine’s environmental interests and will heap greater expenditures upon the
budget than those intended to be reduced by the building of the canal
Decision to build Danube–Black Sea canal 
turns a blind eye to other alternatives
Government brainstorms
for new ideas to boost
economic growth 
From 10 to 12 October, the town of Yaremche
hosted a conference on “Acceleration of
Ukraine’s Economic Growth: Priority
Objectives”, organised by the Ministry of
Economy and European Integration of
Ukraine, together with the Agency for
Humanity Technologies, sponsored by USAID
and the Europcar Company. About 80
representatives from the Ukrainian
government, international organisations,
nongovernmental think tanks, and
businesses from over 20 organisations met to
devise recommendations for the government
to accelerate economic growth.
Recommendations for essential governmental
decisions were formulated by conference
attendees in thematic working groups. 
Boosting Ukraine’s investment
attractiveness was acknowledged by
conference attendees as being one of the
key factors required for improved growth.
Participants believe that in this regard, the
government should discontinue extending
benefits to individual enterprises and
sectors, eliminate free economic zones and
priority development territories, and
instead create viable mechanisms for VAT
reimbursements to exporters, as well as
postpone the adoption of the Economic
Code, which in its present redaction not
only contradicts the Civil Code but legalises
government interference in private business
affairs, which is not tolerated in
economically developed countries.  
Conference materials will soon be made
available for public use. For further
information, please contact Vitali Bigdai 
at tel.: (38+044) 236+1292 or email to
vbigdai@icps.kiev.ua.
delta formation. This option features
greater reliability of the canal and far lesser
annual dredging volumes; experts stimated
that dredging operations for the lock canal
would amount to about 200,000 cubic
metres annually, which is ten times less
than for the projected canal across the
Bystre.
For further information, 
please contact Liudmyla Kotusenko 
at tel.: +380+44+236+1292, 
or email lkotusenko@icps.kiev.ua.
Foreign relations
Creation of the Common Economic Area
regional union by Ukraine together with
Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan is a mistake
that could increase the political and
economic dependence of Kyiv on Moscow.
If this scenario comes about, it will have
negative consequences for Ukraine’s
European integration, although the EU’s
desire to have peaceful and predictable
neighbours will leave Ukraine the
possibility of benefiting from the
expansion of the European Union. Further
development of UkrainianAmerican
relations, which had been renewed in
conjunction with the war in Iraq, are
hindered by insufficient reforms in
Ukraine—particularly in the area of its
democratisation.
Further improvement of relations with the
USA will be possible only if Ukraine
undertakes quality reforms, otherwise the
relations risk coming to a standstill. The
development of relations between Russia
and Ukraine will be more difficult if
Ukraine’s leaders pay attention to their own
country’s political interests; however, this
would increase Russia’s attempts to
influence decision making in Ukraine. If
this happens, there will be negative
consequences for Ukraine’s European
integration process, but the EU’s desire to
have peaceful and predictable neighbours
will leave Ukraine the possibility of
benefiting from EU expansion.
Political competition
Poor success in Ukraine’s foreign and
domestic policies is again undermining the
coalition of progovernment forces; as a
result, there may be a partial cabinet
shuffle. Although the coalition remains a
leading force in Ukrainian politics, it is
finding it more and more difficult to
conduct an effective state policy.
Meanwhile, radicalisation of the political
conflict, which is a result of the upcoming
election, is making the political
environment ever more unpleasant.
We expect that the progovernment
coalition will survive until the election, with
a possible small shuffle during the next two
months. Until autumn 2004, the united pro
government forces shall maintain their
control over the parliament and executive;
this situation will be helped by the clear
division of the opposition camp into two or
more parts. The government also has a great
chance to take advantage of this split in
order to conduct political reforms that
would transform Ukraine from a
presidentialparliamentary to a
parliamentarypresidential republic. At the
same time, the coalition will be less
successful in other areas of national policy,
leaving Viktor Yuschenko still in the best
spot to become Ukraine’s new president.
State policy
Among all the all the reforms needed in
Ukraine, the coalition primarily concentrated
on changing the model of government.
Actually, they will first of all have to reduce
the negative effects of the presidential
election in 2004 (opposition leader Viktor
Yuschenko looks set to win). This increases
the risks of not correcting but intensifying
the faults in the present model. As earlier,
economic policy is missing reforms and
market attitudes to the government
officials, although stable budget and
moneys will allow further economic growth.
The agreement on creating the CEA will not
bring Ukraine into a freetrade zone with
Russia, though it may provide Moscow an
additional instrument with which to put
pressure on Kyiv during the preelection
period. Ukraine’s European integration
policy will have only fragmentary success,
given that Ukraine’s demand that the EU
recognise its European future correlates
poorly with its consent to come under
greater influence from, and also given its
halfhearted political and economic reforms.
While they are providing slow progress for
the country, their chances for improvement
or acceleration before the 2004 election are
very small.
Economic environment
After stalling this summer Ukraine’s GDP
growth is slowly accelerating, thanks to a
better harvest of late crops and growth in
construction and industry. This will
facilitate budget revenues that will permit
the government to finance its expenditures.
At the same time, low turnaround on
increasing social expenditures could be
hindering any increase in incomes of the
population from GDP growth. Another
remaining threat is rising inflation—which,
as earlier, is held back by administrative
regulation of bread prices.
We forecast an increased real GDP at year
end 2003 by 6%. We do not anticipate any
worsening in the foreign economic situation
in Ukraine's export markets, at least until
the end of 2003. However, regardless of the
increased import of grains, the positive
current account balance not only will not
shrink—it will continue to increase,
reaching 3.3 billion USD by yearend. The
nominal hryvnia to dollar exchange rate will
remain stable, while consumer price growth
will continue during the next few months,
and will achieve 6.5% in 2003. We forecast
that in 2003 the consolidated budget will
be executed in full measure, with a deficit
of 0.5% of GDP that will be financed above
all by means of foreign public borrowing
and privatisation.
political commentary offers the
international community a monthly overview
of trends and a forecast by ICPS experts on
the development of Ukraine’s domestic and
foreign policy. The publication gives an
informed picture of the level and direction of
changes unfolding in Ukraine, as well as
assists foreign investors to realistically
assess political risks. 
Starting from this issue, political
commentary will be disseminated by
subscription. If you wish to regularly 
receive subsequent issues, 
please contact Maksym Korepanov 
at tel.: +380+44+236+5464 
or email: marketing@icps.kiev.ua. 
For further information regarding the
political situation in Ukraine, please contact
Ehor Sobolev at tel.: +380+44+236+4477, or
by email at esobolev@icps.kiev.ua.
The fourth issue of ICPS’s monthly Political Commentary has been published,
featuring an overview of major trends in Ukrainian policy during September
2003. ICPS experts believe that the current arrangement of political forces will
persist till the upcoming elections in October 2004, with all efforts of
politicians focused on the desire of the current powers to retain their standings
after the election, and the reaction of the opposition forces to this. ICPS
analysts assessed negatively the current prospects for creating the Common
Economic Area; however, forecasts for the growth of the Ukrainian economy
were upgraded from, 4% to 6.5% 
Power struggles in Ukraine stymie reforms
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